Working with local administrations has technical consequences worth understanding before sizing a project. Medium and small town councils rarely have their own cybersecurity team; they rely on technical assistance from the Diputación and on external suppliers. In practice, that means a large share of the burden of demonstrating conformity falls on the supplier. And RD 311/2022 provides for this: Article 2.3 applies the royal decree to the information systems of private-sector entities — including the obligation to hold the security policy required by Article 12 — when they provide services or supply solutions to public-sector entities, under a contractual relationship, for the exercise by these of their administrative competences and powers, and it requires tender specifications to include the requirements needed to ensure that conformity, expressly mentioning Conformity Declarations or Certificates.
Basic category is the real entry point of this market, and it deserves precision because it is misread in two directions. On one hand, «basic» does not mean little: Annex II of RD 311/2022 contains 73 controls across 16 families and three frameworks, and a substantial part of them is already required at that category, including op.nub.1, «Protection of cloud services», which applies from basic category. On the other hand, «basic» does change the conformity route, and that makes the process cheaper and shorter: Article 38.1 establishes that basic-category systems only require a self-assessment for their declaration of conformity — without prejudice to also undergoing a certification audit — while medium- or high-category systems require an audit for certification. For a technology SME wanting to get into municipal procurement, that difference is what makes the project viable.
In a municipal environment, the technical work concentrates where the actual findings are: the op.exp family of the operational framework — asset inventory, security configuration, change management, protection against malicious code, activity logging — and op.acc access control. On top of that, risk analysis with MAGERIT modelled in PILAR, the methodology and tool of the Centro Criptológico Nacional, and cryptographic configuration under CCN-STIC-807. Categorisation is done under Annex I, assessing impact across the five dimensions listed in Article 40.2: availability, authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and traceability. None of this changes from province to province; what changes is the scale at which it is applied and the budget behind it.